

Navigating Security Challenges

How current security threats affect shipowners and how to mitigate these risks?

Britannia P&I Loss Prevention



Navigating Security Challenges

Speakers



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Loss Prevention Officer
Loss Prevention
Britannia P&I



Ong Xinyi

Fleet Manager
Claims
Britannia P&I



Max Williams

Chief Operating Officer
Africa Risk Compliance
Limited



**Debashish
Roychoudhary**


Lieutenant Commander
International Liaison Officer
International Fusion Center

Geopolitics

Red Sea region

- Strategic importance of the Red Sea covers
 - One-third of worldwide container traffic
 - 40% of Asia-Europe trade pass through the Red Sea
 - 12% of the world's seaborne oil and
 - 8% of LNG traverse the Suez Canal
- Current geopolitical conflict in Yemen and Somalian piracy and most recently the tensions in the Strait of Hormuz continue to escalate

Shipping damaged in attacks off coast of Yemen




Source: BBC news

Geopolitics

Yemeni conflict

- An armed political and religious group - the Houthis has been a central element in Yemen's ongoing civil war, challenging the internationally recognized government
- Targeting commercial vessels of specific country or flag, with over 100 attacks reported since 19 November 2023
- Some using one-way attack drone (OWA-UAV) or by missiles, speedboats or helicopter
- These attacks caused significant damages to ship and forced shipping companies to take alternative security measures or reroute

Route Comparison: Example Vessel Routings via Suez and Cape of Good Hope (15k TEU FCC)



Source: MSI

Other threats to Maritime Security

Piracy and Armed Robbery

- In the latter part of 2023 and into early 2024, there was a concerning series of hijacking incidents
- Opportunists
- High speed skiffs
- Small arms fire/rocket propelled grenades
- Boarding ships in transit
- Ransom of ship and crew
- Long-term captivity



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Maritime Security and Current Threats to Merchant Shipping


Britannia P&I

Africa Risk Compliance Limited

10 July 2024









Houthi Attacks on Shipping











Houthi Attacks on Shipping

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)				
	Name	Picture	Range	Characteristics
1	Mohit		180km	Electro-optical & Infrared (EO/IR) tracking.
2	Asef		450km	EO/IR tracking.
3	Tankil		500km	EO/IR tracking.
4	Faleq		140km	EO/IR tracking.
5	Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar		Unknown	EO/IR tracking. Little information available.
6	Mayun		Unknown	EO/IR tracking. Little information available.







Houthi Attacks on Shipping

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)				
	Name	Picture	Range	Characteristics
1	Rubezh		80km	Radar-homing. Heavy warhead of over 500kg.
2	Al-Mandab 1		40km	Radar-homing. Highly destructive.
3	Al-Mandab 2		300km	Radar-homing. Highly destructive. Yemen-made.
4	Sayyad		800km	Radar-homing
5	Quds Z-0		800km	Electro-optical tracking
6	Sejil		180km	Unknown tracking system



Houthi Attacks on Shipping


Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) / Water-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDS)

	Name	Picture	Characteristics
1	Skiff model		Slower converted fishing skiff with 75kg of explosive.
2	“Blow fish”, Toufan.	 	Remote control or human-controlled then abandoned before final approach.
3	Converted 33ft Patrol boat		Remote controlled. Includes shaped charged from a missile designed to puncture ship hull.



Houthi Attacks on Shipping


Accuracy and Effectiveness of Houthi Attacks





Houthi Attacks on Shipping

Targeting – Which Vessels and How




Houthis maintain intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tools:

- Radar stations along the coast.
- UAVs
- IRGCN vessel Behshad (IMO 9167289) is assessed as Iranian spy ship which may be passing info to Houthis.



Resurgence of Somali Piracy

- Since November 2023, ARC has recorded 38 incidents related to Somalia-based piracy.
- Most incidents involve hijacking of fishing vessels and/or dhows, with 19 dhows hijacked (EUNAVFOR Op Atalanta).






Resurgence of Somali Piracy

At least 3 Somali pirate groups active currently.

- Northern Somali coast, based near Boosaaso and active near Socotra Island.
- Eastern Somali coast, based between Xaafun and Garacad, active in southern Somali basin.






West African Piracy

Maritime crime remains high throughout the Gulf of Guinea:

- High levels of IUU fishing.
- High levels of black-market trading, especially in oil and fuel'
- Pirate groups still operating from the Niger Delta.



Stowaways in West Africa



- In April 2023, the Nigerian Navy announced that it had apprehended 75 stowaways at Lagos Port from August 2023 to April 2024.
- In that same period, we documented 17 stowaway incidents at Lagos port involving 101 stowaways.
- Lagos is a hotspot for stowaways, however other ports also remain high risk, including Douala, Ghana ports, Guinea, Abidjan and Dakar.



NIGERIAN NAVY PRESS RELEASE

17 April 2024

THE NIGERIAN NAVY DEcriES THE GROWING MENACE OF STOWAWAYS IN LAGOS WATERS


The Nigerian Navy (NN) is concerned by the upsurge in cases of stowaways in Nigerian waters. For clarity, the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL Convention) defines a stowaway as someone who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo without the consent of the shipowners or the master or any other responsible person. Migration as a stowaway is illegal, dangerous and is considered a security threat to shipowners. In line with the strategic directive of the Chief of the Naval Staff Vice Admiral Emmanuel Ogalla, the NN deployed advanced Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) equipment to vector Quick Response Teams (QRT) to all parts of Nigeria's territorial waters. Consequently, the NN apprehended about 75 stowaways from August 2023 to April 2024.

Specifically, the details of stowaways extracted by the NN between August 2023 and April 2024 are shown in the table below:

Serial	Date	Name of Vessel	Number of Stowaways	Location	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	August 2023	MSC MARTHA	5	Lagos Channel	
2.	September 2023	CHARMINAR PANAMA	8	Lagos Fairway Buoy	
3.	October 2023	GWANGZHOU HIGHWAY PANAMA	11	Lagos Channel	
4.	November 2023	NATAL	8	Lagos Fairway Buoy	
5.	December 2023	CONTAINER VESSEL TEME	4	Lagos Channel	
6.	December 2023	GRANDE GUINEA	2	Lagos Fairway Buoy	
7.	December 2023	MT UOG CONSTANTINE	14	Lagos Channel	
8.	January 2024	FRONT ALTIERS	3	Lagos Fairway Buoy	
9.	February 2024	MT CHIP	4	Lagos Channel	
10.	March 2024	MT ADVANTAGE LOVE	3	Lagos Channel	
11.	March 2024	MT LYSIAS VALLETTA	9	Lagos Fairway Buoy	
12.	April 2024	MT PRINCESS ERIN	4	Lagos Channel	
Total	August 2023 – April 2024		75		

During the operations, the QRT carefully extracted the stowaways who had concealed themselves inside the rudder compartment of the vessels. All apprehended stowaways were handed over to the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) in accordance with the established protocols for further necessary action. The NN wishes to enlighten the general public on the dangers of attempting to travel as a stowaway. These include severe legal consequences and significant health risks such as negative effects of harsh weather conditions, lack of food and water, injuries and even death. Hence, the NN uses this opportunity to discourage Nigerian youths from embarking on such misadventures.

You are please requested to disseminate it to the public.


A ADAMS-ALIU
Commodore
Director of Information


Drug Smuggling in Latin America



- Since 2019 and the pandemic, there has been a huge surge in the smuggling of cocaine onboard merchant vessels.
- The majority of cocaine is smuggled via containers however a significant amount is smuggled by hiding packages on other vessels, including bulk carriers.
- Brazilian ports provide access to the whole world for drugs gangs in South America and therefore have the most recorded incidents.
- Ports in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru remain very high risk due to their proximity to cocaine production centres in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.
- There has also been an increase of incidents in the “southern cone” ports – Argentina, Uruguay and Chile – as gangs try to avoid increased law enforcement in other countries.




Cocaine seizures from Latin America






Cocaine found onboard ships or in ports

Total Cocaine Seizures per Year in Kilograms



Drug Smuggling “Techniques”



How drugs are smuggled via ships



1. **Diver Method** – Used in many ports in Brazil and Colombia especially, divers are used to attach items to the hull or in sea chests for the “parasite” technique. **VERY COMMON**
2. **Crew Method** – Crew members are used to bring and hide drugs on board ships. Crew are approached during shore leave and engaged by drugs gangs to smuggle drugs either through threats of violence or promises of money. **COMMON**
3. **Passenger Method** – Mainly used for cruise ships, cocaine is smuggled by passengers onto the ship either in the passenger’s luggage or on their person. **COMMON**
4. **Stowaway Method** – A stowaway brings drugs onboard with him to carry to the next port. **RARE**
5. **Illegal Actor Method** – Someone boards the vessel whilst it is underway and introduces the drugs onboard. Sometimes carried out with assistance by crew members (*MSC Guyane* case in 2019). **RARE**
6. **Port Official Method** – Someone who comes onboard the vessel from the shore for legitimate reasons but uses the opportunity to smuggle drugs onboard. Stevedores, cleaning gangs, customs officials, surveyors etc. **VERY COMMON**
7. **Rip-on/Rip-off (aka, blind hook / gancho ciego)** – A concealing method that uses containers for illegal drug trafficking. Neither the sender nor the recipient is aware that the shipment is being used to transport illicit goods. **VERY COMMON**
8. **Shipper** - Someone working for a legitimate company involved in the transportation of legal cargo who uses their position in the supply chain to smuggle illicit drugs. **COMMON**

Protecting a vessel from drug smuggling



1. ACTIONS BEFORE ARRIVING AT THE PORT.
 - a. CREW AWARENESS
 - b. PREPARE THE VESSEL

2. ACTIONS WHILST IN PORT (EITHER AT ANCHORAGE OR WHILST ALONGSIDE).
 - a. INCREASE SECURITY LEVEL ONBOARD
 - b. SECURE THE VESSEL

3. ACTIONS BEFORE DEPARTURE.
 - a. SEARCHES

DO THE BASICS WELL.





Collaborative Efforts of IFC to enhance MARSEC

10 July 2024

IFC – Regional MARSEC Info-Sharing Hub

New Partners



International Cooperation and Info-Sharing is Critical for Safe and Secure Seas

IFC's 8 MARSEC Categories



Theft, Robbery, and Piracy at Sea



Contraband Smuggling



Irregular Human Migration



IUU Fishing



Maritime Incidents



Maritime Cyber Security



Environmental Security



Maritime Terrorism

Global Shipping is Vulnerable to Myriad Maritime Security Threats

Thrust #1: Strong Cooperation with MARSEC Partners



Malacca Straits Patrol Exercise



Exercise SEACAT



Regional MARSEC Practitioner Programme



Maritime Information Sharing Exercise

Strengthening Interoperability; Promoting Capacity Building

Thrust #1: Strong Cooperation with MARSEC Partners



Expanding Partnerships – IFC-Latin America in Peru and Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu



MARSEC Exercise hosted by MBC and BAKAMLA



V-RMTC and T-RMN Annual Meeting Hosted by Italian Navy

Strengthening Partnerships Beyond the Immediate Region

Thrust #2 - Strong Community of International Liaison Officers



INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE



LTC LESTER YONG
HEAD IFC



LTC DANIEL NG
DEPUTY HEAD IFC

26 ILOs from 20 Countries

Coast Guards / MLEAs

Navies

 INSP KWEON DONG HEE REPUBLIC OF KOREA COAST GUARD ILO	 CDR ANGELA SALIH NAVAL PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD ILO	 MAJ LE TRUONG LIEN VIETNAM BORDER GUARD ILO
 CDR TREVOR EDWARD PARRA UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ILO	 SA GREGG MCLAUGHLIN UNITED STATES NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE ILO	 LT HOANG VAN TUYEN VIETNAM COAST GUARD ILO

 LCDR MICHAEL LEE BOOTH AUSTRALIA ILO	 LT MUHAMMAD ASQARI BIN HAJI EMRAN BRUNEI ILO	 LCDR SOK SOL CAMBODIA ILO	 LTC GREGORY ALEXANDER WETTE CANADA ILO	 LCDR QIN HAO YANG CHINA ILO	 CDR STEPHAN LITZLER FRANCE/ EU ILO	 LCDR CHRISTIAN HEBERING GERMANY ILO	 LCDR DEBASHISH SUNIL ROYCHOUDHARY INDIA ILO	 LCDR NOVIE ADLOF DDONSEDA INDONESIA ILO	 LCDR WADA YOUSUKE JAPAN ILO
 LCDR KAMARULADHIWA BIN ABD SALAM MALAYSIA ILO	 LCDR NYAN WIN HTET MYANMAR ILO	 LCDR MARK RONALD DOUGLAS NEW ZEALAND ILO	 CDR LUIS ENRIQUE NALVARTE MALAGA PERU ILO	 LCDR ARNOLD SANTOS ENRIQUEZ PHILIPPINE ILO	 LT KIM CHANGON REPUBLIC OF KOREA ILO	 CDR PHUYAJAK PHUVANATHARANU BALA THAILAND ILO	 LCDR NELSON MCMILLAN UNITED KINGDOM ILO	 CDR DANIEL PHILIP RANDALL UNITED STATES ILO	 LT NGUYEN VIET CUONG VIETNAM ILO

 MAJ JOSEPH LEE HEAD OPERATIONS	 MAJ SURENDRAN HEAD EXERCISES AND ENGAGEMENT	 MES GIBERT CHIAM INFO-SHARING EXPERT	 MES SETH ANG INFO-SHARING EXPERT	 MES EDWARD CHO INFO-SHARING EXPERT	 MES MARTIN TAN INFO-SHARING EXPERT	 CPT SHAUN TED STAFF OFFICER	 CPT JOSIAH HOW STAFF OFFICER	 MR TAN KIAN HAO MARITIME LIAISON OFFICER, SHIPPING ENGAGEMENT	 MS JOAN CHUNG ASSISTANT DIRECTOR SHIPPING ENGAGEMENT	 MS KIRSTIE LEE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND COMMS	 MS DAPHNE CHAN ILO MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXECUTIVE	 PTE JOON KIAT DPS & EX ASSISTANT
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ILOs Bring Unique Professional Experience and Reach Back to Respective HQs for Information

Thrust #2 - Strong Community of International Liaison Officers



Led Shipping Engagement at Shared Awareness Meeting

Led MARSEC Discussions at 48th SHADE Conference



Drove Info-sharing and Led Discussions at Multilateral Exercises

ILOs Lead SME Discussions at Multilateral Forums and Contribute to Success of Exercises

Rescue of Distressed Migrants - 'LADY R3'



Vietnam ILO Info-Sharing Facilitated Prompt Response From Vietnam People's Navy.

Thrust #3 - Shipping Partnerships and Initiatives

**Establish
Personal
Relationships**

**Direct
Access to
Ship Masters
and CSOs**



Deepening Mutual Trust through Shared Awareness Meetings and Focus Group Discussions



Strengthening Interoperability through Ship Visits and Company Security Drills

Enables IFC to Co-opt the Shipping Community as Our “Eyes and Ears” at Sea


Thrust #3 - Shipping Partnerships and Initiatives



Raising MARSEC Awareness through Participation in Maritime Conferences and Workshops

Promoting Best Practices, Sharing Different Perspectives

Thrust #3: Shipping Partnerships and Initiatives



Ops Coordination During Incidents and Development of Products

45th SHARED AWARENESS MEETING

CAPT David Coles
Commander, Combined Task Force 152

- Detected and engaged over 100 Houthi UAV, ASBM, USV, and UUVs, targeting innocent commercial vessels.
- Provided critical damage control assistance to the M/V Marlin Luanda, averting disaster that threatened lives and risked environmental damage

HMS Richmond takes over for HMS Amazon in support of Operation PROSPERITY GUARDIAN in the Red Sea.

The Decatur (T-ESD-900) sets sea in support of Operation PROSPERITY GUARDIAN.

CO-ORGANISERS: ASA SSA

Maritime Trade Information Centre

UKMTO
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations

ROYAL NAVY

MDAT-GOG
Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade - Gulf of Guinea

MOAT GOC
Maritime Operations Awareness for Trade - Gulf of Guinea

William Benbow
RN MDA Programme

Conduit between Shipping Community & MARSEC Stakeholder

Contributing Beyond IFC's AOI; Ensuring Safety and Security of Global Shipping

Thrust #3 - Shipping Partnerships and Initiatives

Increase
MARSEC
Awareness



Establish
New
Partnerships



Expanding Industry Network in the Region through FASA/ASA Events and Maritime Conferences


Expand Beyond Singapore; Increase Industry Engagement Significantly

Thrust #3 - Shipping Partnerships and Initiatives

Provide
Timely &
Direct
Reminders to
Ships



MARITIME AWARENESS WEEK (21 - 25 AUGUST 2023)



Encouraged Ships to Implement Shipboard Protection Measures before Transiting Areas of Concern

Collaboration with Ships to Provide Timely Reminders on Security Measures in SS

Thrust #3 - Shipping Partnerships and Initiatives

Maritime Awareness Partnership (MAP)

- To timely share info and provide MARSEC updates directly to ships, eg informing ships in vicinity of a sea theft incident to be more vigilant
- Require company's fleet contact details including email addresses and contact numbers
(Contact details will be handled with the utmost confidentiality)

Enhance
Voluntary
Community
Reporting
(VCR)


Respond to Ship's Distress Signal



Lobivia responded to rescues 24 crew of Rubymar



Rubymar was observed sinking at the stern after reporting hit on 18 Feb 24




Rubymar was observed partly submerged after 17 days 5 Mar 24



IFC's Direct Linkages with Ships Enabled Quick Info-Sharing

IFC Products Enhance MARSEC Awareness



INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE

MID-YEAR REPORT 2024 (JAN-JUN) MARSEC OVERVIEW IN IFC'S AREA OF INTEREST

In the first half of 2024, the IFC recorded a total of 1995 incidents, a 27% decrease from the same period in 2023 (1500 incidents), which is likely due to increased enforcement efforts, leading to fewer MARSEC incidents at sea.

THEFT, ROBBERY, AND PIRACY AT SEA (TRAPS)

Reported incidents in 2024: **50** (70 in 2023 over same period) 29%

Hijacked incidents: **0** (2024) vs **0** (2023)

Serious injuries/deaths: **0** (2024) vs **0** (2023)

3 main areas of concern (by incident numbers):

- Chattogram and Entabdia Anchorage: **7**
- Singapore Strait: **21**
- Damal and Lank Gony Anchorage: **6**

MARITIME INCIDENTS (MI)

Reported incidents in 2024: **302** (528 in 2023 over same period) 43%

Types of vessels:

- Fishing Vessel: **181**
- Small Boat: **40**
- Passenger Vessel: **39**
- Cargo Vessel: **33**
- Yacht: **23**
- Others: **88**

Locations of incidents:

- Philippines: **66**
- Indonesia: **58**
- Malaysia: **27**
- Vietnam: **24**
- India: **23**
- China: **22**
- Others: **88**

Top 3 types of incidents:

- Sunk-Capsized: **125**
- Adrift: **44**
- Collision/Grounding: **41**

Types of vessels targeted:

- Bulk Carriers: **24**
- Tankers: **8**
- Cargo Vessels: **5**
- Tugs and Barges: **5**
- Others: **8**

Observations:

- The number of incidents has decreased significantly compared to the same period in 2023, likely due to increased enforcement efforts by authorities and the vigilance of the shipping community, especially in the Singapore Strait (SS). However, there has been a rise in incidents in the Chattogram/Kutubdia and Damal/Lank Gony anchorage areas.
- If enforcement efforts continue and the shipping community remains vigilant, the IFC expects the downward trend of incidents to continue into the second half of 2024. However, there are areas of concern in the aforementioned anchorages, where perpetrators may resort to such crimes due to socio-economic factors or the need for alternative income following crackdowns on other maritime crimes such as IUU/F.

CONTRABAND SMUGGLING (CS)

Reported incidents in 2024: **376** (434 in 2023 over same period) 13%

Types of vessels:

- Small Boat: **182**
- Fishing Vessel: **51**
- Cargo Vessel: **51**
- Container Vessel: **49**
- Passenger Vessel: **25**
- Others: **159**

Types of contraband:

- Drugs: **114**
- Domestic Products: **85**
- Tobacco: **69**
- Fuel: **45**
- Others: **63**

Observations:

- The number of incidents has decreased compared to the same period in 2023, likely due to enhanced enforcement efforts and the implementation of economic policies for certain commodities, making smuggling less lucrative.
- The IFC expects CS to remain an area of concern in the second half of 2024, likely due to the increasingly unstable global economic and political conditions, which may impact enforcement efforts.

Top 3 types of drugs smuggled are Methamphetamine, Cocaine and Cannabis.

ILLEGAL, UNREGULATED, AND UNREPORTED FISHING (IUUF)

Reported incidents in 2024: **293** (300 in 2023 over same period) 2%

Top 3 local locations:

- Malaysia: **67**
- Philippines: **39**
- Sri Lanka: **25**

Top 3 IUUF locations:

- Malaysia: **85**
- Philippines: **39**
- Sri Lanka: **38**

Top 3 peaching locations:

- South Korea: **31**
- Australia: **26**
- Malaysia: **18**

IRREGULAR HUMAN MIGRATION (IHM)

Reported incidents in 2024: **55** (124 in 2023 over same period) 56%

Top 3 migration routes (number of incidents):

- Between Indonesia and Malaysia: **19**
- Between Philippines and Malaysia: **13**
- Indonesia to Australia: **7**

Top 3 departure locations (number of migrants):

- Malaysia: **383**
- Bangladesh / Myanmar: **258**
- Indonesia: **254**

Types of incidents:

- Maritime Pollution (MARPOL): **13**
- Maritime Illegal Exploitation (MIE): **3**

Observations:

- The number of incidents has decreased compared to the same period in 2023, likely due to enforcement efforts by regional authorities. Of note, there has been a notable decrease in number of people moving from Bangladesh and Myanmar to Indonesia and Malaysia, and an increase in the number of migrants entering Australia.
- Based on past trends, the IFC expects that economic or political insecurity, conflict, and the displacement of minorities will potentially be the main catalysts for irregular methods of migration in the second half of 2024.

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY (ENVSEC)

Reported incidents in 2024: **16** (48% in 2023 over same period)

Types of incidents:

- Maritime Pollution (MARPOL): **13**
- Maritime Illegal Exploitation (MIE): **3**

Observations:

- The number of incidents has decreased compared to the same period in 2023. Majority of the incidents are due to MARPOL, mainly in waters off China, Malaysia and South Korea.
- The IFC expects ENVSEC to remain an area of concern in the second half of 2024, likely due to the continued high levels of maritime activities and the prevalence of darkened vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers, which increase the risks of spillage and accidents at sea.

CYBER SECURITY (CYBSEC)

Reported incidents in 2024: **3** (77% in 2023 over same period)

Observations:

- The number of incidents has decreased compared to the same period in 2023, likely due to a lack of open-source reporting.
- The IFC expects cybersecurity threats in the industry to remain significant in the second half of 2024, as evidenced by reports of malware infiltrating the computer systems of cargo vessels in Europe this year.

MARITIME TERRORISM (MT)

Reported incidents in 2024: **0** (0 in 2023 over same period)

Observations:

- There has been no incident since 2021, likely due to the ongoing enforcement effort by authorities.

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The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) serves as the regional Maritime Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub covering most of the Indo-Pacific region. With a team of 26 International Liaison Officers from 16 allied nations and 137 worldwide MARSEC linkages as of 30 Jun 2024, the IFC facilitates MARSEC information sharing and collaboration between its partners to our operational responses. To get access to data trending and analysis in the IFC's Area of Interest, please visit our website for our products or IFC MARSEC external data dashboard.



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6 Jul 2023

IFC Shipping Advisory 1/23 – Photographic Evidence of Sea Theft Incident along Westbound Lane TSS, Singapore Strait

The IFC received photographic evidence of a sea theft incident while transiting the Westbound Lane of Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), Singapore Strait. Please advise your ship masters to watch out for similar types of wooden boats that are operating in the area, which typically feature a flat-bottomed hull with a narrow open deck. The photo below shows the boat used by the perpetrators in the incident.



The IFC recommends vessels transiting along the Singapore Strait to adopt ship protection measures such as (1) turn on weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the poop deck, (2) maintain an all-round lookout at an elevated position with focus on suspicious small craft(s) approaching or in proximity to the ship's aft, and (3) sound ship's alarm when suspicious small craft(s) sighted. The IFC also encourages ships to provide photographic or video evidence to educate the industry the modus operandi of the perpetrators and help the authorities when their investigation.

Light Resource Measures are Sufficient to Deter Perpetrators from Boarding in SOMS

Recommended Shipboard Protection Measures

RECOMMENDED SHIPBOARD PROTECTION MEASURES

Key Observations and Insights – From Sea Robbery Incident Reports

- The modus operandi of perpetrators remains consistent with that of petty crime: (a) avoided confrontation, and (b) fled immediately upon being sighted by ship crew
- In majority of the reported incidents, perpetrators boarded the targeted vessels from the aft using grapnel hook or ladder
- Hence, IFC assess that the adoption of basic shipboard protection when transiting known hotspots would suffice to deter potential perpetrators from even attempting to board vessel, without imposing additional load to ship crew

Recommended Measures



Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position, with focus on suspicious small craft(s) approaching or in proximity to the ship's aft



Turn on weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear-facing lighting on the poop deck



Sound the ship's alarm when suspicious small craft(s) sighted



Lookout at elevated position



The weather deck lights around the accommodation block



Rear facing lighting on the poop deck



Rear lookout at elevated position



Lookout at elevated position with deck light



Safe & Secure Seas for All!

Transit through high-risk areas

Red Sea Conflict – How the Club can assist with contractual issues



- Xinyi Ong, Fleet Manager, P&I and FD&D
- 10 July 2024

Agenda

- Timeline of Events
- Standard War Risks Clauses
- Case Study
- Takeaways



Timeline of Events

8 OCT

USA sends vessels to the Red Sea

- In response, cruise missiles and drones were launched by the Houthi militants towards these vessels

19 NOV

MV GALAXY LEADER

- First vessel to be recognized as part of the Houthi attacks
- Vessel was hijacked and sailed to Al Hudaydah
- Beneficially owned by an Israeli company

24 NOV – 3 DEC

MV CMA CGM SYMI, CENTRAL PARK, UNITY EXPLORER, NUMBER 9

- Vessels had clear Israeli links (either via beneficial/past ownership, management or operation)

Timeline of Events

10 – 15 DEC

Houthi Attacks escalate

- 10/11 Dec – the Houthis announced that they would be targeting any ships heading to Israeli Ports
- A mix of Vessels with actual/perceived Israeli connections or perceived to be trading to Israel were attacked, including container vessels
- 15 Dec – Maersk announced that they would be halting all Red Sea transit, followed by MSC, Hapag Lloyd and CMA CGM

MID – LATE DEC

Attacks continue

- A series of Vessels with Israeli links continue to be targeted with varying amounts of damage
- 18 Dec – Operation Prosperity Guardian announced

JAN 2024

- 10 Jan – Increased drone and missile attacks from the Houthis
- 12 Jan – US and UK led airstrikes against the Houthis, merchant ships warned to stay away for 72 hours
- 15 Jan – First US-owned Vessel(MV GIBRALTAR EAGLE) attacked
- 26 Jan – First UK-linked Vessel (MV MARLIN LUANDA) attacked
- Increased Houthi attacks in the Gulf of Aden, and Houthis begin to attack US/UK linked ships

Timeline of Events

Feb – Mar

Increased attacks on Vessels

- Both US and UK linked vessels are targeted.
- 18 Feb – MV RUBYMAR attacked and sunk. This was the first vessel to result in a ship being abandoned and sunk.
- This attack resulted in a 29km oil slick and led to an environmental disaster with heavy oil leaking. Attempts at salvage were precluded by the security risks
- 6 Mar – MV TRUE CONFIDENCE hit by Houthi missiles, resulting in a catastrophic fire and loss of 3 lives. This was the first fatal Houthi attack.

April – May


Houthi attacks continue but success rate falls

- Numerous attacks are still being recorded
- While vessels are still being hit by missiles, they have largely been able to proceed on their own power to the next destination
- The Houthis put out a statement that attacks in the Red Sea would continue until Israel halts the military offensive on Hamas

June

- 12 June – MV TUTOR struck on her engine room and stern. One casualty reported, vessel abandoned and sunk
- 13 June – MV VERBENA struck by 2 anti-ship cruise missiles and set ablaze. Vessel was abandoned

Standard War Risk Clauses



Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration using calculations from Vortexa

Note: Voyage time is calculated for laden Suezmax tankers traveling at 14 knots without extended chokepoint delays.

BIMCO CONWARTIME 2013 / VOYWAR 2013

Definition of War Risks

"War Risks" shall include any actual, threatened or reported:

War, act of war, civil war or hostilities; revolution; rebellion; civil commotion; warlike operations; laying of mines; acts of piracy and/or violent robbery and/or capture/seizure (hereinafter "Piracy"); **acts of terrorists; acts of hostility or malicious damage**; blockades (whether imposed against all vessels or imposed selectively against vessels of certain flags or ownership, or against certain cargoes or crews or otherwise howsoever), **by any person, body, terrorist or political group**, or the government of any state or territory whether recognised or not, which, in the **reasonable judgement** of the Master and/or the Owners, **may be dangerous or may become dangerous** to the Vessel, cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel.

Liberty to Leave War Risks Area

BIMCO CONWARTIME 2013

The Vessel shall not be obliged to proceed or required to continue to or through, any port, place, area or zone, or any waterway or canal (hereinafter “Area”), where it appears that the Vessel, cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel, in the reasonable judgement of the Master and/or the Owners, may be exposed to War Risks whether such risk existed at the time of entering into this Charter Party or occurred thereafter. Should the Vessel be within any such place as aforesaid, which only becomes dangerous, or may become dangerous, after entry into it, the Vessel shall be at liberty to leave it.

BIMCO VOYWAR 2013

If at any stage of the voyage after the loading of the cargo commences, it appears that, in the reasonable judgement of the Master and/or the Owners, the Vessel, cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel may be exposed to War Risks on any part of the route (including any canal or waterway) which is normally and customarily used in a voyage of the nature contracted for, and there is another longer route to the discharging port, the Owners shall give notice to the Charterers that this route will be taken. In this event the Owners shall be entitled, if the total extra distance exceeds 100 miles, to additional freight which shall be the same percentage of the freight contracted for as the percentage which the extra distance represents to the distance of the normal and customary route.

BIMCO War Risk Clause: 2013 vs 1993/2004

- The previous versions of the CONWARTIME clause required the Master to show that the Vessel “*may be, or are likely to be exposed to War Risks*”.
- This has been interpreted in *The Triton Lark* [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 151 to require Owners to show a real likelihood that the Vessel would be exposed to the relevant War Risks.
 - Seems to imply a need for factual evidence rather than just pure judgment
 - May require expert input to establish the risk
- The 2013 editions of the clauses require less complex analysis of the degree of risk, but still requires the shipowner to demonstrate that a reasonable judgment was made on the available evidence that there was a high level of danger.

Case Study

BR

The Vessel



- Bulk Carrier
- Singapore-flagged
- Owners: Singapore
- Charterers: UAE
- Both parties confirmed no connections to Israel
- Voyage from Australia to Yemen
- CP concluded mid Dec 2023, contained VOYWAR 1993 clause

The Query



- Early Jan 2024: While the vessel was enroute to the load port, Members wrote to the Club to ask for advice on whether it was safe for the Vessel to proceed to Yemen, and what their rights were under the CP/VOYWAR to reject these voyage instructions

Initial Advice

Prior to Loading of Cargo

- Lawyers were appointed to get an initial opinion on the rights under the CP
 - VOYWAR 1993: requirement to show “*a real likelihood*” and to collate evidence showing an increased risk to the Vessel
 - Advice was given that while there was an increase in the number of attacks, the point for consideration was the risk to the particular vessel rather than generally.
 - It was concluded based on the attack trends that there was no increased risk to the Vessel itself unless Israeli links were present.
 - Conclusion was that the right under VOYWAR 1993 to refuse voyage instructions was not activated.
- Correspondents in Yemen were also consulted to get the latest update on whether Vessels would be allowed to enter the port
 - Advice was given that unless the Vessel had called at Israel in the last 10 port calls, the Vessel would not be affected.

Subsequent Advice

En Route to the Discharge Port



- By mid-February, the situation in the Red Sea had escalated and Members reached out for a second time to ask for a fresh opinion on whether they now had the right to ask for alternative discharge instructions to avoid going into the Red Sea.
- In particular, Members wanted to know if the situation had escalated enough to activate the VOYWAR 1993 clause.

Subsequent Advice

En Route to the Discharge Port

- Advice was given that the overall risk had increased since the date of the CP.
 - While the Vessel was not Israel/UK/US linked, the Houthis had started to attack vessels with no obvious links, which was a cause for concern.
 - Members were advised that if they intended to refuse to discharge at Yemen, this decision should be documented with evidence to demonstrate the risk assessment which led to the decision.
 - Updated advice was also sought from Yemeni correspondents, who advised that it was still safe for the Vessel to proceed so long as there were no Israel/UK/US links.
- Eventually, Members decided to proceed to Yemen and successfully discharged without any damage.

Takeaways



Takeaways

- Where Members have doubts about whether to proceed, it is important to gather information to form an early opinion, whether from the Club, lawyers or even correspondents.
- Advice will often be vessel specific, and it is impossible to give a blanket “yes” or “no”.
- For volatile situations, the legal position can change in a matter of days and it is important to get updated advice
- Once a decision is made, it is important to ensure that the evidence supporting this decision is kept safely.

Loss Prevention Guidance


Britannia P&I Loss Prevention
James Ng



Actions prior to transit

Risk assessment and hardening measures

- Consult flag state for any security advice
- Plan the voyage taking into consideration the latest threat intelligence and incident reports
- Seek alternative safer route
- Conduct a ship-and voyage-specific threat risk assessment to identify potential security threats (reporting/ awareness)
- Conduct security and damage control drills before entering as per ISPS
- Consider transiting at safe-maximum speed



Actions prior to transit

Risk assessment and hardening measures

- Implement vessel hardening measures as per Ship's Security Plan, Vessel Hardening Plan - BMP-5
- Assigning extra lookouts
- Register with and report voyage plans to the UKMTO
- Transiting during the hours of darkness may reduce the threat of UAV attacks, UAVs are generally active during daylight hours





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LOSS PREVENTION SECURITY UPDATE



- Britannia Loss Prevention is collaborating with Africa Risk Compliance Limited (ARC) to provide regular security updates from the maritime security hotspots around the world
- Kindly contact the Club should members wish to receive these updates

Club's Security Advice



ABOUT SERVICES LATEST KNOWLEDGE PUBLICATIONS LOSS PREVENTION BSAFE VIDEOS



ONBOARD SECURITY

PHYSICAL SECURITY

STOWAWAYS

CYBER SECURITY

ONBOARD SECURITY GUIDANCE – KEEPING THE CREW SAFE THROUGH SECURITY MEASURES AND TRAINING



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KEEPING THE CREW SAFE IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. THIS GUIDANCE PROVIDES VALUABLE ADVICE AS TO HOW SECURITY MEASURES CAN BE IMPLEMENTED TO INCREASE THE ONBOARD



OPERATING IN AREAS WITH ONGOING GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS OR CONFLICTS

SHIPOWNERS FACE A NUMBER OF CHALLENGES WHEN OPERATING VESSELS IN AREAS WITH GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS. NAVIGATING THROUGH SUCH REGIONS REQUIRES CAREFUL PLANNING, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND ADHERENCE TO LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS.

Before entering an area with high-risk tensions or conflicts it is recommended to always notify the Club's underwriting department. In addition, the Joint War Committee (JWC) circular on Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils should be consulted. If the area is listed by the JWC list, it may also have a direct impact on hull premium.

The below provides practical advice on how to mitigate some of these risks:

- Consult the flag state for any advice or recommendations for navigating in a particular high tension area
- Follow flag state requirements in relation to Ship Security Levels under the ISPS Code
- Review any regional specific security guidance on the region, such as the Best Management Practice Guides
- Conduct a pre-voyage threat and risk assessment before entering regions with ongoing tensions
- Amend the Ship Security Plan if the pre-voyage security threat and risk assessment deems it necessary
- Ensure the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and any other identification systems are switched on and functional unless otherwise advised or for security reasons. If a system is turned off remember to keep a paper trail to later document that it was switched off due to security reasons
- Consider privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel as a risk mitigation measure only in regions where local regulations permit their use
- Preserve Voyage Data Recorder data in the event of an incident
- Conduct Security drills prior to entering these areas
- Avoid entering exclusion zones

Q&A

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